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Norms matter! The role of international norms in EU policies on asylum and immigration  
Christof Roos and Natascha Zaun
1
 
 
(European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 45-68, date of acceptance: 10 February 
2014) 
 
Abstract 
 
This article investigates how international norms impact on EU asylum and immigration policy. To 
this end we scrutinize the assumption that the robustness of international norms indicates the quality 
of EU integration. Drawing on international norms literature we argue that four characters define an 
international norms’ robustness: specificity in definition, binding force, coherence with domestic 
law and international law, and concordant understanding among actors. Our analysis covers three 
EU policy areas, asylum policy, family reunification policy, and labour migration policy. Across the 
three areas international norms had had varying degrees of robustness at the time of EU 
negotiations. The findings show that presence and robustness of international norms on asylum or 
immigration regulation are reflected in EU legislation. Given that there are more robust norms 
available on questions of status than on reception conditions or asylum procedures, the qualification 
directive was much easier to agree on than the reception conditions or the asylum procedures 
directive which were much more characterized by hard bargaining. The international norm, right to 
family life, was sufficiently robust and was codified in EU law. However, both the international 
norm and the EU law do not provide for clear admission criteria. On labour migration, robust 
international norms with regard to equality provisions for migrant workers are mirrored in EU 
legislation on residence rights of migrants. With regard to conditions of admission, the absence of 
international norms indicates little to no EU legislation.    
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Research on EU immigration and asylum policies has so far focused on the micro-level
2
 of EU 
policy-making, studying the negotiations and the role of different actors. We aim at broadening this 
picture by adding the macro-level perspective to the debate. Borrowing from international relations’ 
literature, we focus on the role of norms and their impact on political action and policy.
3
 The core 
question this paper addresses is hence which role international norms play in the EU level policy-
making processes. The international norms’ literature observes that the more robust a norm is, the 
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more likely it is to be observed either on the international or the domestic level.
4
 In the international 
norms’ literature robustness is defined through specificity, binding force, coherence and 
concordance. Based on these characteristics, we observe similar developments on the EU level. We 
argue that robustness of international norms indicates whether and what kind of EU legislation in 
immigration and asylum policy is established. A varying degree of robustness can account for a 
different degree of integration and liberal or restrictive legislative output in the field. The claim of a 
causal inference between the robustness of international norms and the density of EU legislation 
cannot be evidenced by the empirics presented. The identification of a pattern is a first attempt that 
aims at provoking further research. So far, this relationship between international norms and EU 
legislation has not been made the focus of attention among EU immigration and asylum scholars. 
However, looking into it sheds light on one more piece in the puzzle of EU integration in this least 
likely case for common EU policy. It helps us understand that EU legislation on some issues is more 
likely than on others. To do so we trace the international dimension of the norms codified in EU 
law.  
 
We draw on insights from document analysis and interview material.
5
 The paper structures as 
follows: The next section will be dedicated to the theoretical model we advance. In the third section, 
we will analyse the role of international norms in the EU level legislative process in the areas of 
asylum migration, family migration, and labour migration. In the fourth part, the results will be 
discussed in order to understand how far norm robustness can be seen as an enabling and 
disenabling factor in EU integration on asylum and immigration policies.   
 
 
2. Theoretical framework: International norms and normative regimes in migration and 
asylum policy 
 
Two approaches towards norms can be distinguished, namely norms as values and norms as rules. 
Norms understood as values provide a collective understanding about certain end-states, such as 
justice and freedom, or about the proper behaviour of actors, such as fairness and solidarity.
6
 Norms 
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as rules differ from norms as values in the sense that they prescribe specific actions on more or less 
clear-cut issue areas. Values are more general and prescribe preferred goals that inform the attitude 
of actors.
7
 They usually underpin rules which are an institutionalised and formalised manifestation 
of norms. Rules and values are hence two sides of the same normative coin. Policy instruments 
regulate highly specific issues and are usually composed of a set of rules. In this paper we focus on 
norms as rules and argue that the more robust an international norm has become, the more likely it 
is to make its way into EU policy instruments and particularly legal instruments.
8
  
 
In doing so, we draw upon the literature on norm robustness and legalization which we adapt for 
our purposes.
9
 Broadly speaking this literature distinguishes a couple of factors which influence 
norm robustness. Although the terminology might vary, some of the concepts used are very similar. 
The factors expected to influence norm robustness are specificity, binding force and coherence. A 
fourth factor, concordance, is expected to be both a result of robustness and a motor further 
stipulating robustness and hence the production of EU law in the field.  
 
Norm specificity  
Norm specificity describes how well norms are defined and understood by actors. It refers to the 
question how clear a norm is, i.e. whether it seems to be a laborious code or rather is relatively 
straightforward and simple. Countries arguing about the content of a norm are a good indicator for a 
norm not being very specific.
10
 Other authors refer to this concept as determinacy
11
 or precision
12
. 
According to Abbott et al. norms are not either precise or imprecise, but can be situated somewhere 
on a continuum between a vague principle to a precise, highly elaborated rule.
13
 However, norm 
specificity does not lead to EU legislation in a deterministic way. As norm specification in the case 
of FRONTEX has shown, unspecific international norms are often developed further in the EU 
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context to meet new challenges and further align diverging interpretations in EU Member States.
14
 
In the case of a rather unspecific norm, it is important that the other criteria (including concordance) 
are fulfilled in order to have successful EU legislation. For instance, if subsequent case law has 
further specified the norm or a majority of EU Member States adopt a concordant interpretation, 
chances are higher to have EU legislation. 
 
Binding force 
Binding force means that states are legally bound by a rule. Expressly non-legal norms, such as 
those laid down in declarations are obviously of another quality than binding rules of international 
law, like ius cogens or treaty law.
15
 The binding effect is, however, strongest, if norms can be 
enforced, for instance by courts. Hence, treaties which are under the jurisdiction of a court (e.g. the 
European Convention of Human Rights) have much stronger binding force than for instance 
recommendations by the United Nations General Assembly. Abbott et al. distinguish between 
obligation and delegation. According to them, obligation concerns the degree of formalization of a 
legal norm and delegation refers to enforcement
16
 e.g. through courts. For our purposes here, 
however, we take them together and subsume them under the notion of binding force.   
 
Coherence 
Another aspect which influences norm robustness is coherence with other norms. In order to be 
considered legitimate a norm needs to resonate with the established normative context into which it 
is brought.
17
 Norm coherence has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. In the domestic 
context the norm must be coherent with legal norms of a higher rank (e.g. a constitutional norm) 
and legal norms of the same rank (e.g. other laws). In an international context it needs to be 
coherent with domestic norms of signatory states and other international norms. 
 
Concordance 
Concordance refers to the way actors agree or disagree with norms that are codified in international 
treaties and conventions. If the norm is widely accepted in diplomatic discussions on the 
international level and if states adhere to it domestically, they act concordant with the norm. Norm 
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concordance hence reflects the intersubjective agreement with the norm.
18
 In our paper we 
operationalise concordance through ratification of a treaty in which this norm is enshrined or 
through endorsement in positions of collective actors (e.g. if there is no pertinent treaty law). 
Positions were collected in interviews with collective actors in Austria and Finland. Collective 
actors from these two EU Member States exemplify the spectrum of normative positions, ranging 
from agreement to disagreement with certain norms that can be expected. Right wing opposition 
against immigration and diversity has been strong in both countries.  
 
Whereas the binding force is relatively unproblematic to assess, both specificity and coherence of a 
norm are highly contextual and require interpretation. Hence, a totally robust norm is an ideal type 
which will never be found in the real world. Even relatively robust norms are subject to varying 
interpretations among states that subscribe to these norms. Norm concordance is hence expected to 
be both a result of norm robustness and a factor that strengthens robustness: The more EU Member 
States have a similar interpretation of a norm, the more likely they are to adapt legislation reflecting 
this norm and sidelining those Member States which initially followed another interpretation.  
 
Obviously, the more of these factors are present, the more robust the norm is and the more likely is 
its representation in EU law. With regard to specificity, however, this relationship is not so 
unidirectional. Rather, as has been shown on similar issues, the lack of specificity of an 
international norm is the reason why Member States feel the need for EU legislation in the first 
place. If this is the case, however, the other factors need to be present for EU legislation to be 
established.   
 
3. European Asylum and Immigration Policies 
 
We will now look closer into three core areas of EU policy-making in the field of immigration, 
namely into legislation on asylum policies, legislation on family migration, and labour migration in 
order to understand how the presence or absence of an international normative regime influences 
EU policy-making in the field. 
 
3.1. The international norms regime and collective actors’ position on norms in asylum 
and refugee policies 
 
Qualification Directive 
Negotiations on the qualification directive and its recast were far less controversial than those on 
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the other two directives. As we will show, drawing on some examples of the original directive, this 
directive contained a number of robust norms such as refugee protection and non refoulement. 
Norms that lacked specificity like non-state persecution were further specified through the 
qualification directive. 
    
The right to protection for refugees is a comparatively robust norm. It is a norm endorsed by 145 
States which are signatories to the Geneva Convention and many of the states party to the 
Convention finance the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a UN institution which 
focuses particularly on the protection of refugees. Member States’ concordance with the norm can 
hence be described as high. In fact, none of our interviewees which work for collective actors in 
states party to the Geneva Convention questioned the fact that people in need of protection from 
persecution should be granted asylum. Asked who should be granted preferred access to their 
territory, all of them answered that refugees should, without any reference to quotas etc., be granted 
access. This position is advanced by actors across all party affiliations, even those which are known 
for restrictive attitudes towards immigrants in general (ÖVP/A, FPÖ/A, KOK/FIN, True 
Finns/FIN). Access for these people should be granted unconditional (Green Party/A, UNHCR/A, 
SOS Mitmensch/A, Red Cross/A, Red Cross/FIN) and society should not have the right to decide 
who may have access to protection and who not (SOS Mitmensch/A).  
Apart from a relatively high degree of concordance, the norm of refugee protection is relatively 
specific (for exceptions see further below on non-state persecution) and clearly establishes criteria 
to determine who is a refugee, as shows art. 1 of the Geneva Convention. It defines a refugee as  
 “[a] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it”. 
 
Moreover, the norm is binding, as it is laid down in an international treaty and it is coherent with a 
whole range of norms which are established around it. It was hence codified in art. 9 and 10 of the 
qualification directive. 
 
The norm of non refoulement (i.e. the norm not to send a refugee back to a place where his or her 
life or freedom would be threatened on the account of the grounds stated above) is not only 
established for refugees (art. 33 para. 1). It is also transferred to other persons by the Convention 
against Torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CAT) in cases 
where there are “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture” (art. 3 para. 1 CAT). 154 states are party to the CAT. In contrast to art. 3 CAT, the 
7 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also covers inhuman treatment or 
degrading treatment or punishment in addition to torture (art. 7 ICCPR). In various Concluding 
Observations, Views and two General Comments (number 20 and 31), the Human Rights 
Committee has established that the 167 states party to the ICCPR are obliged to not send someone 
to a place where his or her rights under  art. 6 and 7 ICCPR risk being violated. Art. 6 para. 1 
ICCPR also protects the right to life which could be interpreted as a prohibition to send someone to 
a country where he or she would face the death penalty. Art. 3 of the ECHR also protects against 
refoulement as case law has established (cf. ECtHR case of Soering v the UK). Hence, non 
refoulement is a highly coherent norm which can be found across a number of international treaties 
(hard law), it is binding to the degree that it can be enforced by the ECtHR in the Member States 
and all Member States are concordant with it.   
 
The perhaps most controversial issue in the directive was the question whether non-state actors can 
be considered persecutors in line with the Geneva Convention. As the actors of persecution had not 
been specified in the Geneva Convention, interpretations of the Geneva Convention were quite 
divergent on this issue. Hence, this issue remained unresolved for more than a decade: Article 5 of 
1996 Joint Position followed the line of interpretation of the more restrictive Member States not 
accepting victims of non-state persecution. The recognition of victims of non-state persecution, 
however, became binding with the qualification directive (art. 6 lit. c) in 2004. By the time 13 out of 
15 Member States had already accepted victims of non-state persecution and the more restrictive 
Member States, Germany and France, were increasingly isolated on that matter.
19
 Most Member 
States had become concordant with the more liberal interpretation which was also advanced by 
UNHCR Handbook (paragraph 65). Moreover, the German and French position was incoherent 
with developments in international law which recognized the increasingly strong role of non-state 
actors. The fact that non-state actors are now recognized as state like actors can certainly be seen in 
cases like that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Moreover, in the cases of Adan and Aitseguer the UK 
House of Lords had ruled that it amounted to ‘refoulement’ sending somebody back to France and 
Germany where non-state persecution was not recognized. Especially French courts had hence 
started to increasingly introduce elements of the protection view into their jurisdiction (e.g. CRR, 
SR, 22 July 1994, E, 21; CRR, 17 April 1997, L, 22; CRR, SR, 6 Oct. 1997, B.) At this time most 
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legal scholars already supported the view that non-state actors could be considered persecutors
20
 
and other regional institutions had already endorsed it. These were article 3 (3) of the Cartagena 
Declaration of the Organization of American States and article 1 (2) of the Convention of the 
Organization of African Unity. The EU qualification directive hence let to a specification of the 
Geneva Convention for the Member States of the European Union.  
 
Overall negotiations on the qualification directive were less controversial than those around the two 
other directives. The reason for this was the fact that norm robustness was particularly high with 
regards to the qualification directive and Member States’ policies had converged throughout the last 
decade. 
 
 
Reception Conditions Directive  
 
The UNHCR Handbook specifies that refugees are refugees as soon as they fulfill the criteria for 
refugee status which can be well before their status is formally determined: “Recognition does not 
[…] make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of 
recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee” (para. 28). Hence, ‘asylum seekers’ need to 
be provided at least some rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention, namely those rights which 
are for refugees which are simply present and lawfully present.
21
   
One of the most controversial issues in the reception conditions directive, freedom of movement, is 
such a right available for applicants who are lawfully present (art. 26). As other norms establish, 
however, states can restrict the rights of non-nationals as compared to nationals and particularly 
make ‘lawful stay’ for non-nationals conditional to a stay in a certain part of this territory. The norm 
of freedom of movement for non-nationals is not only unspecific but also not coherent with the 
broader normative context.
22
 This leads to a very divergent practice in Member States in which most 
grant it unconditionally, but others make asylum seekers’ stay conditional to them living in clearly 
defined areas with no general permission to travel within this Member State. A point in case is 
Germany where stay permits are limited to the district of the local office for foreigners by law and 
the applicant can only leave the district with a special permission or in order to appear before a 
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court. Courts have ruled that permissions to leave this area can also be granted to avoid ‘unintended 
hardship’ in case full participation in school activities depends on leaving the district or visits to 
close family outside the district would be made impossible. Among others, however, opportunities 
for imposing restrictions are limited by respect for family life which is protected both by the 
German constitution and art. 8 ECHR. As Bank highlights “international law does not afford any 
further protection to asylum seekers”.23 Member States hence are not concordant with the norm of 
freedom of movement for non-nationals. This restrictive practice is in fact not incompliant with 
international law, as there is no specific and coherent norm granting freedom of movement to non-
nationals unconditionally. Hence, EU instruments have not taken this norm up yet or even specified 
it. 
 
Closely related is the issue of detention on which the Geneva Convention only holds that refugees 
should not be detained for ‘illegal’ entry (art. 31). Art. 5 para. 1 ECHR on ‘liberty and security’ also 
restricts the states’ possibility to detain. While the first Reception Conditions Directive does not in 
any way restrict detention of asylum applicants, it was especially the European Commission which 
promoted limits for detention by introducing several articles on detention into its proposal for the 
recast directive.
24
 This norm of freedom from detention seems to be robust. It is not only specific, 
but has binding force through being enshrined for instance both in the Geneva Convention and the 
ECHR. Most Member States are also concordant with it. One Member State, however, that detained 
asylum applicants for illegal entry was Malta. Malta wanted to negotiate illegal entry as a ground 
for detention into the recast directive (Council Doc. 15119/10: 3, footnote 6), but remained 
unsuccessful.  
On another issue which was highly controversial during the negotiations, i.e. access to the labour 
market for asylum seekers, the Geneva Convention remains relatively silent. It only establishes this 
right for refugees who are lawfully resident.
25
 The norm of access to employment is therefore not 
specific and binding and accordingly Member State practice varied substantially during both the 
negotiations on the reception conditions directive and its recast. 
Apart from freedom from detention, none of the norms presented here was robust and hence 
negotiations on reception conditions were much tougher and characterized through bargaining that 
on the qualification directive.  
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Asylum Procedures Directive 
The Geneva Convention remains silent on what a fair asylum procedure looks like. In fact, as para. 
189 the UNHCR Handbook holds, 
 
“It is obvious that, to enable States parties to the Convention and to the Protocol to implement their provisions, refugees 
have to be identified. Such identification, i.e. the determination of refugee status, although mentioned in the 1951 
Convention (cf. Article 9), is not specifically regulated. In particular, the Convention does not indicate what type [sic!] 
of procedures are to be adopted for the determination of refugee status. It is therefore left to each Contracting State to 
establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate, having regard to its particular constitutional and 
administrative structure”.  
 
Subsequently, the Handbook only identifies a number of “essential guarantees” which remain, 
however, rather general such as the clear definition of the authority taking the first instance decision 
and reasonable time for appeal in case of rejection. These norms are not very specific in the sense 
that they do not specify the characteristics of a fair procedure but rather list some general principles.  
  
Apart from the UNHCR Handbook there is no legal document and especially no treaty of any 
binding force which deals with procedural norms. The only norms which can be found are those on 
access to an effective remedy and legal aid. The norm of an effective remedy is enshrined both in 
art. 6 and 13 ECHR and it is also a community principle. It is binding, specific, coherent and 
concordant. What is not specified, however, is whether legal aid has to be free in all cases. Here 
again practices between Member States differ widely. In Austria for example legal assistance is 
restricted to counselors specifically designated by national law and in Germany free legal assistance 
is subject to a merits test.
26
 There are further examples of practices which were common in some 
Member States, but completely alien to the procedural system in other Member States. Thus, some 
Member States considered practices of others unlawful. In the absence of any norms which could 
serve as focal points, negotiations were highly controversial and the directive itself comprised many 
exceptions which puts into question the legal quality of the text. Given that procedural norms 
diverge hugely between Member States,
27
 any norm that would have been adopted on the EU level 
would not be coherent with broader normative context on the domestic level which can account for 
the low degree of harmonization and the number of exceptions introduced in this directive.  
 
3.2. The international norms regime and collective actors’ position on family migration 
 
International norms for regulating immigration and immigrants’ rights can be found dispersed 
among various treaties defining human rights, labour rights, or trade relations. Actually, there is no 
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single convention nor treaty or international organization
28
 that would see after and promote norms 
on the regulation of all immigrants’ admission and stay.29 Basically, conventions on two immigrant 
groups can be distinguished: migrants that claim access to a country due to family reunification and 
labour migrants. Within the latter category numerous subcategories can be found that distinguish 
between the migration of skilled and unskilled as well as specific types of workers.
30
 In terms of 
international norms there is a significant difference between family and labour migration. The norm 
to enjoy family life legitimizes the immigration of family members. However, no such right that 
would allow to work or to search for opportunities abroad can be claimed by labour migrants. The 
following paragraph discusses the robustness of the international norm “right to family life”. The 
norm’s vague specificity, partial binding force, as well as coherence and concordance will be 
assessed.  
 
Until 2003 when the family reunification directive was adopted, immigration of spouses and 
children of third country nationals in the EU was subject to different conventions. The family is 
considered a core unit of society. Therefore, international conventions define a general right to a 
family and oblige the state to protect it.
31
 Internationally, the norm calling for the protection of 
family life is defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. Article 16(3) 
defines that: “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and entitled to 
protection by society and the state”. Accordingly, the convention holds its signatories responsible 
for creating the conditions that protect family unity. The first extension of this norm to migrants was 
established by the ILO and its convention on migrant workers and its supplementary provisions 
(C97 and C143 of 1949 and 1975). States that ratified the convention were bound to take measures 
that allow for the reunification of migrant workers with their families. Those were defined broadly 
as the migrant’s spouse, children, and parents (ILO C143, Art. 13).  The European Social Charter 
(1961 and 1966) (art. 19) as well as the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers from 1977 (art. 12) included this norm, too. In addition to the ILO’s conventions, the 
European conventions defined migrants’ family reunion more specifically, not only requesting the 
state to provide for channels of entry but also in terms of a right that can be claimed for by 
                                                 
28
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29
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York: Routledge, 467-479, 469. 
30
   A third category is not recognized in international conventions, which is the category of educational migrants 
comprising students and researchers. 
31
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migrants. In this regard, a general principle was extended specifically to migrants. However, 
ratification of these conventions is rather incomplete
32
 which does not guarantee the norm’s 
application.
33
 In the European context the binding force of the norm was secured by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) from 1950. All 47 members of the Council of Europe signed 
the convention which codifies in its articles 8 and 12 that everyone is entitled to the right to family 
life and to start a family. Breaches of these articles can be ruled upon by the European Court of 
Human Rights.
34
 On various occasions, the European court protected with its case law immigrants’ 
basic right to family unity at the time the EU directive was not yet adopted (e.g. Moustaquim v 
Belgium, Beldjoudi v France). The ECHR, although enforced by a supranational court, mainly 
protected migrants’ families that were already resident within the territory of a Member State.35 
Conditions for family reunion were hardly defined in the conventions. This provoked a situation in 
which conditions for family reunion would not be covered by an international norm’s binding force. 
The binding force of the norm was limited by its vague specificity.
36
 At the same time, all Member 
States would consider the right for family unity in their domestic legislation or even in their 
constitutional law. Most of them would also provide for legislation that allowed for immigrants’ 
family reunification.
37
 Accordingly, three out of four factors defining a norm’s robustness were 
present.  
 
However, one should not conclude from the coherent application of the norm that domestic actors 
fully agree with immigrants enjoying a right to family life. For example, in Finland and Austria, 
actors call for restrictions of the right of migrants to reunite with their families. Domestic actors’ 
claims on the issue are ambiguous: On the one hand the right to family is hardly denied; on the 
other hand, agreement on the terms and conditions as to how families of migrants should be able to 
reunite is not given. Actors confirm that international norms confine the state’s power to control 
family migration (SPÖ/A, SOS Mitmensch/A, AK/A, RedCross/FIN, Church/FIN) and most agree 
that the right must be respected as an obligation from international law (Caritas/A, Red Cross/FIN, 
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WKÖ/A). Others interpret the right to protection of the family as a right that should be dependent 
upon conditions. They demand that the state should not compromise its sovereign right to admit 
selectively (AK/A, Red Cross/A, Church/FIN). They argue that family migration puts a burden on 
social systems because many family members of migrants are unemployed and have hardly any 
professional qualifications (True Finns/FIN, SDP/FIN, SPÖ/A). Therefore, the right of immigrants’ 
spouses and children to join should be conditional upon requirements such as language skills, 
assessment of their employability on the local labour market, and familiarity with the culture in the 
destination country (ÖVP/A, KOK/FIN). Some even claim that immigrants would abuse the right 
and thus delegitimize the system of human rights based immigration (True Fins/FIN). In 
comparison, actors do not claim such measures in order to restrict the refugee protection norm. 
Accordingly, domestic actors’ concordance with the norm is only partially given. The international 
norm right to family life for migrants is vaguely specific, partially binding, coherent and partially 
concordant. Accordingly, it should be considered to be robust with limitations.  
 
The EU directive on family reunification mirrors this quality of the international norm.  Key issues 
in negotiations on the policy at the EU level were the conditions for reunion which had remained 
unspecific in international conventions. In its proposal for the directive the Commission mentioned 
this gap of international provisions. The directive was proposed in order to give more legal security 
to immigrants’ right for family reunification by defining entry and residence conditions.38 During 
negotiations on the directive in the early 2000s, Member States used these conditions to claim for 
restrictions on migrants’ right to family unity. At the time, Germany, Austria, Greece and the 
Netherlands demanded for provisions that would restrict the right to family reunion as well as 
derogation clauses that would reaffirm their national approaches and leave them the flexibility in 
implementation.
39
 Some of the requirements that must be met by the sponsor and the family 
members to be eligible for enjoying family unity in a European country reflect actors’ call for 
restriction. For example, the German as well as the Austrian government were successful in pushing 
for a provision in the directive that allows Member States to require immigrant children above the 
age of 12 to comply with integration conditions (art.4 (2)).
40
 This age threshold and integration 
conditions could result in separating children from their families. Giving in to claims from Austria 
and the Netherlands, the requirement to comply with integration measures was extended to 
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39
 Agence Europe (2001b) Bringing Directive on Family Reunification into Question? European Coordination 
Expresses Fears for Foreigners' Right to Family Life. Brussels. 8 May, 2001. 
40
 Roos, C. (2013) The EU and Immigration Policies: Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe? Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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migrants’ spouses.41 Using the ability to integrate into the host society as a criterion to be met for 
admission could serve as a means of reducing the number of people who would have access to the 
right of family reunification.
42
 Further conditions defined by the EU directive were the financial 
means available to immigrants’ families and the spouse’s access to the labour market. The 
provisions agreed upon could discourage family-related immigration because access to the labour 
market can be restricted and a call for “sufficient” financial means (art. 7(1)) can be defined 
arbitrarily by member states and lead to restrictions.
43
 The discussion during Council negotiations 
points to an understanding of family reunification as a potential burden to social systems that should 
be reduced.
44
 A public consultation launched by a Green Paper on the directive, put forward by the 
Commission in 2011, aimed at reopening negotiations in order to agree on more specific and less 
restrictive provisions.
45
 Since some Member States responded by calling for a new directive that 
allows further restrictions, the Commission’s plans to suggest amendments to the directive were 
cancelled.
46
 Thus, the rather unspecific international norm could only partially lead to specific 
legislation on the EU level. Member States were not concordant with regard to the directive’s 
purpose; but found their lowest common denominator on disenabling family induced migration. EU 
legislation confines member states to a certain extent, but member states still enjoy a wide range of 
discretion on deciding about admission of a migrant’s family. The international norm, right to 
family life, was sufficiently robust in order to enable its codification in EU law but not robust 
enough to provide for clear admission criteria. The core of the norm, migrants’ right to family life, 
is enforced by EU legislation and EU institutions such as the Commission monitoring the 
directive’s implementation and the ECJ reinforcing its binding force. 
 
 
3.3. The international norms regime and collective actors’ position on labour migration 
 
Compared to asylum and family migration, international norms on regulating labour migration are 
least developed. The Geneva Refugee Convention defines refugees’ rights of protection and the 
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ECHR holds its signatories accountable for the protection of family life. Both conventions have 
implications for admission and residence conditions of these immigrant groups. For labour migrants 
no comparable international rights on admission exist. Two conventions of the ILO (C 97, C 143), 
the UN’s International Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and their Families 
(ICMW) from 1990 and the Council of Europe’s convention on the legal status of migrant workers 
from 1977 deal with labour migrants’ rights as workers and residents. The UN convention attempts 
to secure the human rights of all migrants, such as freedom from servitude and freedom of 
association.
47
 The ILO conventions attempt to cover the entire itinerary of the worker from orderly 
recruitment, to regular entry, protection of stay, to safe return.
48
 On the regional level, the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers defines equality of treatment of migrant 
workers with nationals in areas such as housing, schooling, and social security (art. 13, 14, 18). 
Most EU Member States have not ratified these conventions
49
 although many had implemented key 
provisions in their national law.
50
 Coherence of international norms with domestic legislation was 
partially given; still the international norms had no binding force due to fact that not all signatories 
had also ratified the conventions.  
 
Whether and how states should allow for migrant workers to access their territories is not 
determined by any of these conventions either. The only multilateral agreement that touches upon 
labour migrants’ rules of admission is Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) from 1994. The agreement, monitored by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) commits 
states to set up rules for service providers entering their territory temporarily. The agreement was 
signed by 148 states and is the only agreement in force regulating labor mobility on a global level. 
It only applies to a tiny group of mobile people, business visitors and intra-corporate transferees. 
Scholars are critical on the agreement’s immediate impact but see that in the long run GATS Mode 
4 could make rules on labour migration more binding. As of 2011 they do not consider the 
agreement to create “significant or reciprocally negotiated obligations” on labour migration.51 In the 
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absence of a guiding post defined by international norms, Member States’ legislation on the medium 
and long-term immigration of labour developed very differently.
52
    
 
The specificity of norms on labour migration varies and their binding force is not given across 
conventions. On the level of residence conditions norms are quite specific in terms of defining areas 
in which labour migrants should enjoy equal treatment. Yet, EU Member States’ have not given 
binding force to these norms by ratifying the conventions. On the level of admission procedures, the 
norm to provide a channel of entry for international business mobility is rather specific but hardly 
binding. Any further international norms than the GATS norms on the admission of labour 
migration do not exist. The discourse of domestic actors on labour migrants’ admission and 
residence conditions reflects this pattern. With regard to residence conditions actors are concordant 
with granting equal treatment to migrant workers as defined in the conventions. Concerning 
admission, the conditions of skilled and unskilled migrants’ access to labour markets remain 
disputed. Thus, international norms on migrant workers’ residence conditions can be considered 
robust. In comparison, the few norms on admission have limited robustness.   
 
The norm that basically all actors in Finland and Austria share is the norm of equality in key areas 
such as working conditions and access to social security. Local workers as well as migrant workers 
should be covered by the same rights in order to be protected from exploitation or social dumping. 
International norms on migrants’ rights as workers and residents lacked binding force, but were 
coherent with national law, quite specific and concordant with actors. As such they were sufficiently 
robust and became codified in EU legislation (Directive 2011/98/EU). Still, actors in Finland and 
Austria disagree on the conditions that define workers’ admission. Some hold that admission should 
only be allowed if residents cannot be found for a job. They claim that labour market tests should 
protect local workers against competition from foreign workers (WKÖ/A, AK/A, Red Cross/A, 
ÖVP/A, KOK/FIN). Others disagree with labour market tests and argue that those tests can be 
obstacles to growth and employers’ access to the best workers on the international labour market. 
Accordingly, foreigners should only be required to have an employment offer by a company 
(Network for Free Movement/FIN, STTK/FIN, EK/FIN, IV/A).  
 
The discussions at the EU level on the EU Blue Card, the scheme for entry and residence conditions 
for highly skilled labour, reflect that actors were not concordant on the issue. The Council 
negotiations on the Blue Card showed that admission conditions for labour migration are 
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understood to be defined according to Member States’ individual needs. As a minimum requirement 
for a common legislation, Member States lacked a common understanding whether they actually 
wanted to open their labour markets to workers from third countries. Germany and Austria were 
openly opposed to enhancing competition on their labour markets by allowing foreign workers’ 
entry.
53
 Also, labour market conditions varied from country to country which led to flexible 
provisions for the EU Blue Card. For example, suggested salary thresholds as a condition for 
admission could contradict collective bargaining agreements. In Sweden and Finland the freedom of 
social partners to negotiate such agreements is particularly protected. Among other provisions, the 
obligation for a labour market needs test was left to Member States’ discretion, too (Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC).
54
  
 
In comparison, the single permit and rights’ directive, negotiated from 2009 to 2011, is a piece of 
EU legislation that reduces Member States’ discretion considerably. The directive defines equal 
treatment in areas such as access to social security, public services and working conditions. 
Although the directive implies EU influence on social policy, the goal to grant rights at the EU level 
in order to avoid differential treatment across Member States found acceptance in the Council and 
the European Parliament (EP). In contrast to the Blue Card, opposition could not be bought off by 
granting flexibility in implementation. Limitations in the areas where equality should be assured 
would mean that the directive could not function as a horizontal measure. International norms on 
migrant workers’ equality were coherent with EU law establishing equality for EU nationals using 
their freedom rights within the single market. These rights had been developed since the 1950s and 
step-by-step increased the rights of EU nationals that are resident in another Member State. 
Accordingly, with regard to residence and workers’ rights for migrants, existing EU legislation that 
established the freedoms of the single market for EU nationals was already well ahead of 
international conventions claiming equality. Still, international norms could serve as a frame of 
reference for the equality rights of third-country nationals. The EP involved as a co-legislator acted 
as an advocate for immigrants’ rights for which it could draw on robust international norms. For 
example, it was successful with changing some Council provisions that would have meant that 
equal treatment with regard to social security would not apply to migrant workers that were laid-
off.
55
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EU legislation on migrant workers reflects that the international norm of equality for migrant 
workers was sufficiently robust to be codified in EU legislation. With regard to admission 
conditions, only the GATS agreement defines the need for admission for a narrow group of people. 
Norms that would define equality in access to the labour market or social justice to be considered in  
migrant workers’ admission are not existent at the international level. These limitations in 
international norms development are an indicator for EU legislation that leaves Member States’ 
maximum freedom with implementation. EU policy making reflects that there is a limited common 
understanding of norms that should be applicable to the admission of labour migrants.  
 
4. Norms as an enabling factor in EU integration on asylum and immigration policies 
 
As we have shown in this paper, a varying degree of robustness of norms (e.g. codified in 
international conventions and treaties) reflects the legislative output on the EU level concerning 
asylum migration, family migration and labour migration. This is also shown by positions of 
collective actors in Austria and Finland illustrating this pattern. In our theoretical chapter we have 
stated that the specificity of a norm, its binding force, coherence with domestic norms and its 
concordance (i.e. acceptance among states and endorsement among collective actors) are crucial for 
the norm to be sufficiently robust to make its way into EU legislation.  
 
The norm of refugee protection can be described as relatively robust, although for instance the 
question of who qualifies as a potential persecutor has for a long time not been clarified. The norm 
of recognizing non-state actors as persecutors, however, gained increasing robustness, being 
coherent, increasingly concordant and binding. EU legislation (i.e. the qualification directive) 
helped to further specify it. The norm of freedom of movement for non-nationals at the same time 
was neither specific, binding or coherent and hence did not make it into the reception conditions 
directive.  Freedom of movement more narrowly defined as freedom from detention, however, was 
strengthened through the recast reception conditions directive, because this norm was robust and 
advanced both by the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. In the absence of a robust norm providing 
for employment access for non-nationals, negotiations on this issue were particularly tough  The 
case of the asylum procedures directive furthermore illustrates how the absence of international 
norms which can serve as guiding posts in negotiations leads to rather contradictory legislative 
output which completely misses the aim of harmonization. Hence, only very general norms such as 
access to an effective legal remedy made it into EU legislation.        
 
As concerns family migration the international norm that any person should enjoy the right to a 
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family life was sufficiently robust to make its way into EU legislation.  All Member States have for 
instance ratified the ECHR which grants this right in its art. 8. Also, family reunification was 
coherent with Member States’ domestic or constitutional law, which provided for respective 
provisions. However, many collective actors in Member States see family migration as a huge 
burden to the welfare state and outspokenly consider restrictions on family migration to be 
legitimate. Actors in Finland and Austria, for example, see a need for select immigration in this area 
too and define conditions such as integration requirements. Concordance with the norm can hence 
only be confirmed partially. Given that there is no international law on the reunification of migrant 
families, but rather on family unity, and the fact that it is not ruled how family members should get 
together norm specificity is not given. International conventions hardly touched the definition of 
conditions for admission as a family migrant. The negotiations leading to the Council directive on 
family reunification from 2003 reflect that conditions were not specified by an international 
normative regime and thus open for discussion. A partially binding directive was the result of EU 
policy-making. Although the right to family reunification can be considered a sufficiently robust 
norm, its insufficient specificity and partial concordance among actors leaves room for Member 
States’ diverging interpretation and application.  
 
In comparison to the two forms of immigration discussed above, the absence of any comprehensive 
international normative regime on rights to access for labour migrants, norms on admission are in a 
nascent stage at the EU level. Thus, actors consider it legitimate to deliberately define the 
conditions of admission for labour migrants. The heterogeneous discourse on the national and EU 
level reflects that pre-defined norms hardly exist. Actors’ claims on admission conditions diverge on 
the question if foreign workers’ access to the labour market should be restricted or not. Different 
conditions on labour markets and disagreement on the need for labour migration made it impossible 
to find concordance of actors in EU level negotiations on the Blue Card. Thus, the EU scheme for 
attracting skilled labour migrants leaves flexibility to Member States’ implementation.  The only 
international rights which are robustly established are those of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of national and foreign workers. Those norms were codified in international conventions 
of the ILO, UN, and the European Convention for the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. 
International conventions were quite specific and actors in Member States were concordant in 
demanding equal treatment for local and foreign labour.  Also, the claim for equality between locals 
and foreigners was coherent with Member States’ domestic legislation and a key element in the 
single market legislation on freedom of movement for labour. Accordingly, the EU directive on 
rights for workers gave binding force to the robust equality norm.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The paper was dedicated to giving substance to the observation that robust international norms 
indicate the quality of EU integration in the policy area of EU asylum and migration. The 
theoretical model we advanced was derived from the literature on compliance and international 
norms. We argued that the establishment of a dense regulation and harmonization on an issue on the 
EU level is more likely when a norm is robust. We found that the robustness of international norms 
does reflect the density of EU legislation in an issue area. Whether a norm’s robustness also 
indicates the restrictiveness or expansiveness of EU legislation in a respective issue area is difficult 
to assess. EU asylum and immigration policy is often criticised for being restrictive and 
undermining human rights. At the same time, we observe that most international norms on asylum 
and immigration regulation define human rights such as the right to physical integrity, non-
refoulement, family unity, and individual freedom. Implementing these norms in EU legislation on 
asylum and immigration means to include norms that lie at the core of liberal political theory. Since 
decision makers in the EU multi polity cannot ignore these norms international norms become a 
relevant factor in defining and negotiating policy.  They constrain actors’ positions and thus have an 
indirect impact on EU integration. Accordingly, we observe that a rather liberal agenda of individual 
rights and freedoms finds its way into EU law. 
 
To this point we have identified a pattern; robust international norms are reflected in EU legislation. 
Further research will be necessary to identify the causal links and agents connecting the two levels. 
Then one might observe issue areas where the international level impacts the EU level and vice 
versa. The international level should accordingly not be neglected when studying decision-making 
in the multi polity EU.  
 
 
Interviews 
 
Number Interview  Date 
#1 Green Party of Austria 18.05.12 
#2 United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), Austria 22.05.12 
#3 SOS Mitmensch, Austria 22.05.12 
#4 Red Cross, Austria 29.05.12 
#5 Red Cross, Finland 02.05.12 
#6 Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) 13.06.12 
#7 Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 30.05.12 
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#8 National Coalition Party (KOK), Finland 10.05.12 
#9 True Finns Party, Finland 09.05.12 
#10 Socialdemocratic Party of  Austria (SPÖ) 15.05.12 
#11 Arbeiterkammer (AK), Austria 24.05.12 
#12 Finnish Lutheran Church 09.05.12 
#13 Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP) 08.05.12 
#14 Caritas, Austria 30.05.12 
#15 Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKÖ) 23.05.12 
#16 Asylkoordination, Austria 23.05.12 
#17 Network for Free Movement, Finland 07.05.12 
#18 Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) 03.05.12 
#19 Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) 04.05.12 
#20 Federation of Austrian Industries (IV) 16.05.12 
#21 Finnish Refugee Council 03.05.12 
#22 Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) 04.05.12 
#23 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) 14.05.12 
 
 
 
 
